In the last decade, a number of studies have been published to shed light on the interaction between neuroscience and the law, notably on the introduction of neuroscience data in forensic psychiatric evaluation (FPE). Even if there is a growing consensus on the relevance of neuroscience in clinical practice, the role of neuroscience in FPE is still controversial.
INTRODUCTION
The introduction of neuroscience data in forensic psychiatric evaluation (FPE) && ]. Even if some scholars have correctly underlined the risks that judges, lawyers and legislators may misinterpret neuroscientific data [5, 6] , a general enthusiasm characterizes the debate in the media. Nowadays, it cannot be denied that legal practitioners increasingly seek to refer to neuroscience data as evidence to influence legal proceedings [7 & ,8] . The relationship between mental illness and criminal behaviour is a core issue of forensic psychiatry, but there is no agreement in the literature in either classical or more recent works [9,10 & ]. Empirical data suggest that the presence of mental illness alone does not significantly increase the probability of violent/criminal behaviour [11, 12] . On the other hand, if mental illness coexists with substance misuse the incidence of violence is higher than in substance misuse alone [13 & ,14,15] . Mental illness is also correlated with major vulnerability to past negative and stressful experiences. The most prudent hypothesis suggests that mental illness has to be embedded in a complex, indirect web of neurobiological, social and environmental cofactors [11] . Advances in clinical neuroscience have shown that mental and conduct disorders cannot only be considered as a consequence of the interaction between personal character and environment, but they are also grounded in brain underdevelopment and/or functional abnormalities [16] . Consequently, if it is widely accepted that neuroscience may play a role in clinical treatment of behavioural disorders, then it is also reasonable to suppose a role for neuroscience data in FPE. Obviously, we cannot neglect that the outcomes of clinical practice and forensic settings are different. As proved by the number of studies published in the last years, the interest in forensic psychiatry is spreading over many different cultures and legal systems [17, 18] . Nita Farahany reports 722 cases during the period 2005-2009 in the United States in which neurological or behavioural genetics evidence has been introduced in FPE on behalf of a criminal defendant [19 & ]. In the literature, a number of studies focus on rare and weird cases in which brain tumours, infections, traumatic injuries and morphological abnormalities were supposed to be significantly associated with disorders leading to criminal action [7 & ,20-22] . Although there is some interest in these singular cases, notably for lawyers, there are, however, conceptual, methodological, experimental and ethical hurdles when these single references are taken as future evidence [23,24,25 & ]. Many studies have been published on the use of neuroimaging (e.g. MRI; functional MRI, fMRI; PET) as evidence in FPE [6, 26] . A fierce debate on the potential use of neuroscientific evidence as lie detection has grown starting from the evidence that our brain responds differently to previously encountered than to novel stimuli [27] [28] [29] . Even if many scholars underline caveats and potential misinterpretations [6] and there is a wide consensus in not considering fMRI lie detection in legal settings as a realistic perspective for the foreseeable future, there is a sort of ancestral fascination about the possibility to detect lies and truth [5] . A general hurdle is that neuroscience methodologies are largely designed and validated in order to fulfil experimental outcomes, and they have not been directly considered for legal use. Experimental settings are normally quite limited compared with daily life where legal settings are endorsed.
We aim to review the recent debate on the use of neuroscience data in FPE, underlining both legal and empirical aspects. First, we consider legal and social aspects of the debate. Second, we review classical neuroscience data involved in FPE. Before proposing some conclusive considerations, we also describe other clinical conditions potentially relevant in FPE.
LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE DEBATE: HOW AND WHY NEUROSCIENCE MAY BE INTRODUCED IN LEGAL SETTINGS
An obvious but sometimes neglected consideration is that neuroscientists are not legal experts. In fact, it is not clear for legal practitioners how and why neuroscience may be introduced in legal settings. In the US legal system the rules governing expert testimony traditionally follow two perspectives: the 'Frye' and the 'Daubert' approach [5] . For the former, evidence can be admitted if it 'gains general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs' (from Frye v. U.S., 54 App. D.C. 46, 1923) . For the latter (from Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579, 1993), the admissibility of a specific technique has to be evaluated considering four factors: it has to be testable (or already tested), it has to be debated in peer review literature, and its known or potential error rate and its general acceptance in the relevant scientific domain have to be considered [5,7 & ,30] . Nowadays, an American judge has to decide -case by case -if the Frye or the Daubert approach is more pertinent. Obviously, it can be a slippery and misleading decision. Many legal practitioners and scholars consider Daubert or Frye analysis sufficient to evaluate the admissibility of expert scientific evidence, even if the role of Federal Rules of Evidence (i.e. FRE 403 and FRE 702) cannot be neglected [26] .
Let's consider a notable debate in American legal settings. Roper v. Simmons Supreme Court decision (543 U.S. 551, 2005) ratified that capital punishment for crimes committed by a person under the age of 18 is unconstitutional, because adolescents are developmentally immature. Wide debates followed this judgment, given that the
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amicus brief of the American Psychology Association concerning the Roper v. Simmons decision seems in contradiction to the Hodgson v. Minnesota decision (497 U.S. 417, 1990 ) that ratified adolescents' right to seek an abortion without parental involvement [31] . In agreement with the Roper v. Simmons decision, recent evidence supports the idea that the adolescent brain is not completely developed [32 & ]. Compelling neurophysiological data and fMRI studies on adolescents' brain development indicate that the ventral medial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) and the ventral striatum are involved in the juvenile increased sensitivity to rewards [33] ; in addition, slow maturation of the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex and lateral PFC has been related to immature cognitive control abilities [33, 34] . In sum, the role of neuroscience to shed light on brain development is relevant and the contribution of experimental data is -for this case -compelling.
Unfortunately, potential misleading interpretations of neuroscience data in FPE are frequent [35] . In some legal systems, for example in the United States, jurors are laypersons and they have to speak out against or speak up for the charge of mental insanity [36] . Normally, laypersons are not neuroscience experts and an increasing body of evidence from social psychology suggests that the introduction of neuroimages can be misleading in pleading to the charge of guilty or not guilty by reason of insanity [37,38 & ]. In other legal systems, for example in Italy, the judge has to deliberate on the charge of mental sanity, whereas the psychological/psychiatric expert provides medical advice (that is not binding for the judge) [39] . The intrinsic complexity of the neuroscience data and the rapidly evolving scientific progress may disorient the judge, even if she/he is not completely uneducated about empirical studies. From a legal point of view, neuroscience data are just another kind of empirical evidence potentially relevant in FPE. As we describe in the second part of our review, it is only partially correct.
BRAIN FUNCTIONAL AND STRUCTURAL ABNORMALITIES LEADING TO CRIMINAL ACTION: INTERPRETATIONS AND MISINTERPRETATIONS
A document of the WHO has estimated that 1.43 million people die every year from either selfinflicted or interpersonal violence [40] . From a scientific perspective, the relationship between brain abnormalities and misconducts (e.g. aggressive behaviour and violent reaction) leading to criminal acts (e.g. stabbing and murder) is among the most fascinating issues. A vexing question in biological psychiatry regards the complex notion of psychopathy, its relation to other mental disorders and pathological traits [41,42 & ]. The incapacity to regulate a behavioural response and to control reactions has been widely investigated from a range of perspectives [43,44,45 & ]. The right PFC has been shown to be activated during both classical Go/No-Go studies and more recently in risk-taking behaviours (an indicator of lower regulatory abilities) [46] . A growing body of studies in the literature focuses on a specific subgroup of patients who show callous-unemotional trait in childhood and psychopathic traits in adulthood [47 & ]. Recent study with MRI aims to identify grey matter differences in violent offenders meeting criteria for antisocial personality disorder (ASPD) and syndrome of psychopathy (ASPDþPsychopathy vs. ASPD-Psychopathy) [48 & ]. It seems clear that further clarification on neurobiological underpinnings of psychopathic and aggressive behaviour may assume a crucial role in FPE, even if no data can directly ascertain a direct link (i.e. causal-effect connection and deterministic relationship) between a psychopathological condition and a criminal action.
A traditional model assumes that cerebral anatomical lesions may result in functional abnormalities that, in turn, could cause behavioural changes and executive disorders [49] . Traumatic brain injury (TBI) is considered one of the major and common events that can lead to severe cerebral impairment and consequent clinical and social impairment [50] . Decreased attention, memory and learning are symptoms of the typical cognitive profile after TBI. Recent imaging data have suggested that lapses of attention after TBI are correlated with an increased activation within the default mode network (i.e. an imaging measure of basal brain function) [51] . TBIs frequently lead to behavioural, emotional and social changes which may significantly influence patients' life functioning. Increasing evidence supports a mutual relationship between TBI and impulsivity [52] , executive disorders, socioemotional, sociocultural and economic behaviour changes [53,54 & ]. Interesting data from the forensic mental health populations showed a higher prevalence of TBIs in prison inmates compared with the control population [55] . Convicts with a documented history of TBI are more likely to have alcohol/substance abuse disorders [56] . In turn, alcohol/substance misuse has been correlated with violent offending and partner violence [57 & ]. If it is widely accepted from a clinical standpoint that TBI may lead to behavioural changes and misconduct, may TBI also have a role in FPE? As brain damage could compromise the capability to evaluate alternative circumstances and/or increase impulsivity, TBI may be considered relevant in the detection of mental disability related to a criminal act. Nevertheless, as previously stressed, no data can ascertain a direct link between TBI and criminal action.
ADVANCES IN CLINICAL NEUROSCIENCE AND IMPLICATIONS IN THE FORENSIC FIELD: PSYCHOPATHOLOGICAL EXPERIENCE UNDERLYING CRIMINAL ACTION
Recent advance in neuroscience can help to shed light also on more specific clinical conditions that may have implications in legal settings, notably FPE. Such data may provide clarification on psychopathological experience that underpins criminal action. Let's consider disorders of consciousness in sleepwalking, dopamine replacement therapy (DRT) in Parkinson's disease and misattributions of self in delusional experience.
It is widely reported that sleep loss may affect cognitive performance, executive functioning, emotional responsiveness, memory, and attention abilities. However, the role of sleep loss in affective functioning, for example irritability and short temperedness, has been relatively poorly described [58 && ]. The pathophysiology of sleep deprivation is far from being understood, even if it has been hypothesized that it may involve poor PFC functioning. Reduced PFC activity has been correlated with a reduced ability to regulate responses based on cognitive and social contexts that, in turn, could explain the relationship between sleep loss and impulsive/reactive aggression [58 && ]. Sleep disorders may lead to violent behaviour during sleep (VBS). VBS are often associated with dream-enactment, sleepwalking and sleep terrors, which can be directed towards the self, other individuals or objects [59] . Violent sleepers are unaware and unable to remember their behaviour. It is difficult to detect sleepwalking disorders given that violent episodes are time-limited and completely reversible once the person is fully awake. In spite of the reluctance to report VBS episodes to the physician, however, the scientific literature reports approximately 140 cases involving forensic implications [59] . Should violent sleepers be considered responsible for the violent acts committed during a temporarily impaired consciousness due to a sleep disorder [60] ? A more accurate description of neurophysiological underpinnings of sleep disorders, for example VBS and sleepwalking, is strongly desirable in order to clarify such weird experiences that can -fortunately not often -lead to criminal acts. Notably, neuroscience data can support the assessment for sleepwalking disorders in order to identify potential fakers.
Recently, a number of studies described the sideeffects of DRT in Parkinson's disease. Some patients treated with DRT develop compulsive behaviours and behavioural addictions such as pathological gambling, compulsive buying, hypersexuality and compulsive eating [61, 62] . This pattern of sideeffects has been referred to as 'dopamine dysregulation syndrome' [63] . Unfortunately, the prognosis for patients is far from clear, whereas social, clinical and legal implications are frequently adverse. It has been supposed that excessive dopaminergic stimulation is the underlying physiopathological mechanism that leads to these drug-induced behavioural disorders. Pathological gambling or hypersexuality may lead to committing crimes such as robbery and sexual harassment. Should neurophysiological data about the side-effects of DRT be considered in FPE? Should armed robbery of a casino committed by a drug-induced pathological gambler be judged differently? A biochemical brain imbalance can be related to different pathological conditions, and it is not easy to disentangle the role of DRT compared with other factors in the triggering of compulsive behaviours and behavioural addictions. From a legal standpoint, this is the most vexing question.
Neuroscience can also shed light on delusional experiences and hallucinations. Such conditions may lead to a misunderstanding of real situations (e.g. misattribution of identity), to a loss of sense of reality, to a person detaching the sense of self, and, in turn, may lead an individual to commit criminal acts. Delusions are commonly defined as erroneous, pathological and abnormal beliefs that cannot be modified or replaced, despite clear evidence that they are implausible [64] . Hallucinations (e.g. visual, auditory or olfactory hallucinations) are typically considered as false perceptions [65] , and are furthermore usually described as unintentional and intrusive by patients [66 && ]. There are also other reality distortion symptoms (e.g. anosognosia and confabulation) that cannot be easily categorized. Improved diagnostic techniques, that is, structural and functional neuroimaging, have improved diagnosis among patients with delusions or hallucinations. It has been suggested that delusional misidentification syndromes (e.g. Capgras Delusion, Fregoli Delusion and reduplicative paramnesia) often result from bifrontal and/or right cortical lesions [64] . Obviously, our knowledge of delusional experience is hindered by the difficulty of comprehending the patient's irrational thought processes. Delusions of misidentification and hallucinations can strongly destabilize personal capabilities to interact with relatives, society and the environment ]. Considering that acts of violence have been reported in cases of delusions of misidentification, should such psychotic delusional states due to psychopathological conditions be considered in FPE? How should we consider juridical liability if the aggressor has been induced by a delusional misidentification syndrome to think that his father has been replaced by an imposter with a strong physical resemblance? The complexity of the issue demands further investigation in the future.
CONCLUSION
Neuroscience can have a meaningful role in the clarification of criminal action. We argue that experimental data in FPE can help to clarify criminal experiences and the abnormal intentional contents that led to committing a criminal act. In other words, to clarify criminal experience and his/her intentionality it may be useful to classify, for example, homicide by degree (i.e. -in most US states -first degree murder, second degree murder, involuntary manslaughter and voluntary manslaughter).
Consequently, we claim that the explanatory role of neuroscience data to clarify psychopathological experiences and abnormal intentional contents may potentially be extended to FPE. An enactive, embodied and embedded approach may be the prerequisite to introduce neuroscience data in FPE (Casartelli L and Chiamulera C, in preparation). In a manner that is different from the current legal rules, it may be useful that also the psychiatrist/ neuropsychologist consultant clearly justifies the value and the role of data that he has decided to introduce in FPE. In fact, the major concern is the potential misleading use of neuroscience data by lawyers, judges, jurors and legislators. Consequently, we do not recommend the indiscriminate introduction of neuroscience data in FPE, but we suggest that its value is considered and justified (referring to the scientific literature) on a case by case basis. Above all, we recommend that neuroscience data are not used to directly disentangle legal responsibility assessments, given that empirical data cannot ascertain a direct relationship (i.e. a cause-effect relationship) between a mental defect and a criminal act. Neuroscience in FPE involves a statistically laden correlation. It means that the explanatory value of neuroscience data in FPE has to be considered, adapting it from clinical practice and experimental studies, without overestimating its explicative power. Manifestly, if hurdles and potential biases are attentively considered, quantitative and instrumental support for a mental insanity assessment will be able to considerably improve the reliability of FPE.
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